Russian Arms Sales to China and Disruption of Military Power in East and Southeast Asia, 2000-2013 by Tchakpana, Kokou
 
 
RUSSIAN ARMS SALES TO CHINA AND DISRUPTION OF MILITARY POWER IN EAST 






Submitted to the graduate degree program in Global and International Studies and the Graduate 
Faculty of the University of Kansas in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 


































The Thesis Committee for Kokou Tchakpana 
 







RUSSIAN ARMS SALES TO CHINA AND DISRUPTION OF MILITARY POWER IN EAST 

































Russian arms sales to China have brought about security concerns from China’s 
neighbours. From 2000 to 2013, Russia sold more arms to India than to China. However, China’s 
neighbours and policymakers assert that China’s arms purchased from Russia have disrupted the 
balance of military power in East and Southeast Asia. The purpose of this study were to explore 
how the quality of arms plays a major role than the quantity of arms in the theory of military 
balance of power. A mixed method of descriptive statistics and comparative case study were 
used to determine the findings. The key finding of this thesis is that Russian arms sales to China 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Trends in international arms sales may help to have an idea of the security policy of 
nations in a region. The volume of weapons purchased by a country is an indicator of the 
domestic and international policy of this nation. While global arms sales continue to decrease, 
according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), in 2013, sales of 
Russian companies that produce weapons, such as Tactical Missiles Corporation, and Almaz- 
Antey have increased by 118 and 34 percent, respectively. However, the American firm that 
produces major weapons, the United Aircraft Corporation, increased its sales by only 20 
percent1. From 2000 to 2013, Russia exported 30 percent of its arms to India while 29 percent 
went to China. Furthermore, with 32 percent of the volume of all arms imports, both India and 
China topped the list of the five main arms importers from 2009 to 2013 following by Pakistan, 
the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Saudi Arabia (SIPRI). Thus, the arms sales are noteworthy 
in regional level as well. 
The Asian region is the largest arms importers in the world. The breakdown of trends in 
international arms sales reveals that Asian countries are actively engaged in the purchase of 
weapons. This regional interests in arms, as pointed by (Mitchell, 2009), fit in Russian goals to 
diversify their arms markets in Asia. This diversification of Russian arms markets in Asia is 
materialized through important arms sales, especially in the 2000s. Thus, Asia has experienced 
an increase in arms imports by 34 percent between 2004-08 and 2009-13 while the East and 
Southeast regions have respectively imported 27 and 23 percent of weapons from 2009 to 2013 









2009 to 2013. Such a disparity in rankings between China and India can be explained by who 
the suppliers of weapons in East and Southeast Asia are. 
The United States and Russia dominate the weapon marketplaces in East and Southeast 
Asia. Arms sales, according to SIPRI, are limited to aircraft including drones with minimum 
loaded weight of 20kg, air defense systems, anti-submarine warfare weapons, armored 
vehicles, artillery, engines, missiles, sensors, satellites, ships, all turrets for armored vehicles 
tailored with a gun of minimum 12,7mm caliber or with guided anti-tank missiles, all turrets for 
ships tailored with one or several guns of minimum 57 mm, and air refueling system similar to 
that of tanker aircraft (SIPRI). Most of American major weapons exported to its Asian partners 
including Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan consist of aircrafts including AH-64D Apache Longbow 
helicopters, some latest generation of HA65E Apache Guardian, unmanned aerial vehicles 
(UAVs), some F-16s equipped with high-tech radar system, and the fifth generation of F-35s. In 
the navy, there are some GPS-guided Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) bombs, PAC-3 ballistic 
missile interceptors, Harpoon UGM-84L -Submarine-launched anti-ship cruise missiles- 
(Cabestan, 2014). The list of the American major weapons exported in East and Southeast Asia 
is not comprehensive in this study, it remains important to acknowledge that these arms share 
the same regional destinations with these of Russia. 
Russian major weapons sold to its Asian recipients including China, India, and Vietnam 
encompass combat aircrafts including Sukhois SU- 27/30, SU-30MKI, and MIG29SMT. In naval 
level, exports combat ships including the latest aircraft carrier exported to India and the only 
carrier exported from year range 2009-13; Project 956EM (Destroyer) nuclear-powered 
submarine; and T-50s/90s,Tanks used  both by navy and ground forces (Mitchell, 2009). While 
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the inventory of Russian and American major weapons sold to their Asian military partners is 
far from being complete, the comprehension of the reasons behind such arms sales is critical 
for this study. 
American and Russian arms sales to East and Southeast Asian countries can be 
explained through some patterns of the Cold War. The collapse of the Soviet Union at the end 
of 1991, marking the end of the Cold War between the United States and Russia, gave the 
impression of the reduction of threats between nations around the world. Thus, it was almost 
unnecessary for Asian countries to increase their arms purchase. However, such a period of 
security that reduced the need for arms acquisition by Asian nations (Blanton, 1999), has been 
disturbed by two factors, hence, incited the need for some countries in East and Southeast Asia 
to strengthen their military capabilities. The first factor is globalization. Defined as a system 
characterized by market economy and reduction of the sense of isolation, globalization also 
brings about the sense of insecurity and instability in some part of the world (Stiglitz, 2003). 
These sense of insecurity and instability are triggered in the Asian region by the increase in 
proliferations of illicit arms sales, mostly Russian-made. The instance of the Russian, Victor 
Bout who has made fortune selling Russian arms around the world thanks to globalization is 
interesting. The collapse of the Soviet Union left the new Russia with a huge stockpile of arms. 
Bout took advantage of its relationship with a corrupted Russian military personnel to establish, 
in the word of Moises Naim, “the weapons Wal-Mart” (2005). Bout sold to Asian countries 
different type of arms including some MANPADs (Man-portable air defence systems), and 
aircraft. Thus, the proliferation of arms in the Asian region in the post-Cold war era prompted 
the regional countries to reinforce their military capability. 
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Second, China’s military modernization is an incentive for its neighbours to resort to 
arms purchase as they grow worried about the military superiority of the People’s Liberation 
Army (PLA). Finally, territorial disputes between countries in East and Southeast Asia, can also 
explain why some nations in these regions continue to reinforce their military capabilities 
(Fravel, 2005; Womack, 2011; Bae, 2012; Zhao, 2013). Examples including disputes between 
Japan and South Korea over Takeshima/Dokdo; disputes between China, Vietnam, Philippines, 
Malaysia, and Taiwan over Spratly Islands; disputes between Taiwan, China, India, and Pakistan 
over Kashmir; disputes between Japan, China, and Taiwan over Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. 
Moreover, it is noteworthy to point the dispute between mainland China and Taiwan, knowing 
that both continue to purchase arms in case of a potential breach in the current status quo. 
It is important to point out that all the Russian and American arms importers 
encompassed in the sampling of this thesis such as China, India, Vietnam, Taiwan, South Korea, 
and Japan are involved in territorial disputes. The  reduction of the  presence of American 
military who plays, in the words of Mearsheimer (2010), the “role of a pacifier” in East and 
Southeast Asia, constitutes a source of concerns to  American allies who recourse to self- reliance 
policies to defend their territory integrity and regional interests. Furthermore, the quality of 
their military supplies has crucial implications on the balance of military power in East and 
Southeast Asia. 
The quality of weapons and troops matters more than the quantity because in combat 
modern arms are more efficient and capable of shifting the balance of military power. The 
balance of power consists thus of reducing military capabilities between states so that no state 
has an overwhelming power over the others. The distribution of power among states must be 
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checked and balanced because an increased military might of a state over others in a region or 
system will  upset the balance of military power  (Vasquez and Elman, 2002; Waltz,  1979). 
However, unlike these previous studies that suggest that the sole superiority of quantity of 
weapons (Vasquez and Elman, 2002; Waltz, 1979), or/and military expenditures (Deger and 
Smith, 1983) are sufficient for a nation to shift the balance of military power, this thesis argues 
that the quality of weapons is an essential feature contributing to upset the balance of power 
because in combat between states, as stated by Shambaugh (2000), the quantity of arms is 
irrelevant compared to the quality of manpower, weapons, and training . 
Thus, this study argues that for China to upset the balance of military power in East and 
Southeast Asia by purchasing Russian arms, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) will needs to 
show a combination of features such as a) high quality of arms, b) a larger quantity of arms, and 
c) a larger military expenditure than those of India, China, Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea. 
Thus, these three variables (quality, quantity, and military expenditure) that bring about shift in 
balance of military power are examined in this thesis in order to determine whether Russian 
arms sales to China upset the military balance in East and Southeast Asia. 
The purpose of this study is to explore how the quality of weapons held by China, India, 
Vietnam, Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea can contribute to upset the balance of military power 
in East and Southeast Asia. Many scholars and policymakers have done research on arms sales 
and their implications on balance of military power. While their approaches may have been 
different, giving that they focused either on quantity of weapons, or/and military expenditure, 
they have come to the same finding. This finding explains that the superiority of the quantity of 
arms of a country compared to other nations in a given region upsets this regional balance of
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military power. Despite the political and security significance of this finding, there is still room 
for another factor of influence of arms sales on the balance of military power. That is the 
quality of arms sold. Moreover, few studies have examined the quality of Russian arms sales to 
China to determine their implications on the balance of military power in East and Southeast 
Asia. 
To determine the influence the quality of weapons exerts on the balance of military 
power in East and Southeast Asia, this study used a mixed methods approach. It consisted of a 
sampling of six countries located in the Eastern and South-eastern regions of Asia such as China, 
India, Vietnam, Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea. These Asian countries imported major 
weapons from Russia, or from the United States, from 2000 to 2013. These major weapons 
were analysed according to their type and capability in combat. Data collection on international 
arms transfers from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) served as 
critical resources that lead to the findings in this thesis. Thus, this study uncovers that Moscow 
sells its most sophisticated arms to New Delhi, and also sells India more arms (aircraft and ship) 
than to China. Furthermore, the quality of Russian weapons purchased by China were expected 
to be inferior than American arms held by Washington’s Asian military partners including 
Taiwan, and South Korea from 2000 to 2013. 
In this thesis, Arms Sales is the independent variable. One of the key interests of this 
thesis is to examine the impact of Russian and American arms sales to their military partners in 
the East and Southeast Asian regions on the balance of military power in these regions. The 
independent variable (arms sales) encompasses the quality, quantity, and military expenditure. 
A comparative case study will be used to assess the independent variables for Russian arms 
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sold to India, China, and Vietnam, and to American arms sold to Taiwan, South Korea, and 
Japan during the time frame from 2000-13.The operational definition of Arms sales, in this 
study, consists of the annual amount spent in $ US on major weapons including planes, ships, 
and missiles sold per year to the sample counties of this study; the percentage of  gross domestic 
product (GDP) as a share of the total annual money spent by China, India, Japan, South 
Korea, Vietnam, and Taiwan. It is important to note that the terms Arms sales, Weapons sales, 
and Arms transfers are interchangeably used and are synonymous in this study. 
Moreover, Balance of military power is the dependent variable in this thesis. The Balance 
of power consists, in a system, of a relatively equal distribution of power within the nations 
so that such a power is checked and balanced by other nations. Thus, the absence of this 
power constraint causes a shift in the balance of power in that system2. In this study, the 
operational definition of the balance of military power is a relatively equal quality, military 
expenditure, and the total number of planes, ships, and missiles that China has purchased from 
Russia compared to those purchased by India, Vietnam, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan from 
2000 to 2013. The balance of military power is measured through data collections and 
documentations from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). As a result, the 
balance of military power is known when the quality, the quantity, and the military expenditure 
in military of China, India, and Vietnam compared to those of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan 





See “Did the Vienna Settlement Rest on a Balance of Power?” Paul W. Schroeder The American Historical Review 
Vol. 97, No. 3 (Jun., 1992) (pp. 683-706).Page Count: 24 
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SU-27s are  less  sophisticated  than  the  SU-30s.  However, the SU-30s are qualitatively low 
compared to American F-35 fighters sold to South Korea. 
The puzzle of this study is that there is much press on Russian arms sales to China, but 
there are not sufficient evidence that support how these arms sales have disrupted the balance 
of military power in East and Southeast Asia. This study was to explore how Russian arms to 
China was perceived by China’s neighbors, including India, Vietnam and the U.S. through its 
military allies in East and Southeast Asia, including Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea. Since the 
collapse of the ex-Soviet Union in 1990s, Russia has increased its arms sales to the Asian region. 
Although Russia has sold more arms to India than to China (Kapila, 2012), China’s arms purchase 
from Russia has been perceived as cause of disruption of the balance of military power in 
East Asia. Thus, my contribution to this study is that, while most studies examine Russian 
arms sales to China to determine their influence on the Asian balance of military power, 
few have tested several features of arms sales by stressing on the comparison between the 
quantity and quality of the arms sold, and the military expenditure. To address the quality and 
quantity of the purchased arms, the analysis of data from multiples sources including the 
Western Convention Arms Control Regime (WCACR), Congress on Military and Security 
Development (CMSD), and National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) would be 
relevant. 
To determine whether China’s arms purchased from Russia from 2000 to 2013 has 
disrupted the balance of military power in East and Southeast Asia, I examined and compared 
the quality and quantity of arms that Russia sold to China with those sold to its other Asian 
military partners, including, India, and Vietnam. I then examined and compared the quality and 
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quantity of Russian arms with American arms that the U.S. sold to its military allies in East and 
Southeast Asia, including Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea. The reason why I compared Russian 
arms with American arms was that, according to SIPRI, the U.S, and Russia are the two major 
arms suppliers in Asia. Therefore, any potential shift of the balance of military power caused by 
arms sales from 2000 to 2013 in this region would more likely take in consideration these two 
arms suppliers. Moreover, I examined and compared the military expenditure as a share of 
gross domestic product (GDP) of these Russian and American arms partners in East and 
Southeast Asia, respectively. 
As a result of this study, while a larger quantity of Russia’s arms sold to its Asian 
partners were obsolete because they arms were mostly dated from the Cold War era, the U.S. 
sold mostly modern arms to its military partners in Asia. Furthermore, Russia and the U.S. seem 
to maintain the balance of military power through arms sales to their Asian partners, 
respectively. 
Do Russian arms sales to China upset the balance of military power between the United 
States and Russia in East and Southeast Asian? 
The significance of this thesis lies in the fact that although I utilized only three weapon 
systems (Aircraft, Missiles, Ship) out of ten from SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, the findings are 
significant, and could be a reflection of an ultimate finding if all the weapon system were used 
as independent variable to determine the balance of military power in East and Southeast Asia. 
This thesis proceeds as follows. The second chapter is the literature review. I give a brief 
insight on the balance of power theory. Then, I explain how some countries use arms sales as a 
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foreign policy instrument. I also address, in the literature review, the implications of American 
and Russian arms sales to their partners in East and Southeast Asia while highlighting the 
quality of arms being sold. Then, I explain the significance of military expenditure for a country. 
The third chapter of this thesis is the research design. It encompasses the methods I utilised in 
this study. These are a descriptive statistics and comparative case study. In the fourth chapter, I 
examine the data related to quantity and quality of arms sales, and the military expenditure for 
each country covered by this study. Discussions of my key findings are presented in the fifth 
chapter. I conclude this thesis with some suggestions for a future study on arms sales and their 
implications on the balance of military power theory. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
 
International relations scholars have developed the balance of power theory to explain 
international peace and conflict. They propose that reducing military disparities between states 
will allow no state to have an overwhelming power over the others (Waltz, 1979; Vasquez and 
Elman, 2002). This proposition have been made to explain the reason behind the frustration of 
some states toward others whose power became overwhelming. Similar frustrations from 
nations were noticeable toward the pursuit of supremacy of Louis XIV and Napoleon Bonaparte 
of France, Charles I of Spain, and Wilhelm II and Adolph Hitler of Germany. Thus, the absence of 
order in the world will result in an anarchy where security and stability are only concepts 
(Vasquez and Elman, 2002; Waltz, 1979). To prevent disorder, the distribution of power among 
states must be checked and balanced because increased in military might of one state over 
others in a region or system will upset the balance of military power. There are two types of 
power balancing. 
First, there is external balancing of power (Waltz, 1979). The external balancing of 
power consists of the creation of alliances with other states in order to balance out the shifted 
power. Such alliance, in this study, can be virtually perceived between Russia and India as 
Moscow prefers to trade its modern weapons to India at the expense of China in order to 
balance Beijing’s military power (Kapila, 2012). As the assumed relationship between the key 
dependent and independent variables stipulates that an increase in Russian arms sales to China 
will result in the shift of balance of military power in the Asian region, it is pertinent to point 
that this study is mainly focused on internal balancing. 
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Second, there is internal balancing. It consists of an increase in military capabilities such 
as the rise of military expenditure, an acquisition of sophisticated weapons, and an enlistment 
of more troops with a better training (Morgenthau, 1959; Waltz, 1979). According to Barron 
(2001-02) China resorts to internal balancing by increasing its military expenditure to purchase 
Russian weapons. The Chinese’s need for internal balancing at this level can be explained by the 
fact that not only is China aware of its vulnerability due to domestic social and political instability 
(Whyte, 2010), but Beijing is also frustrated by the superiority of Washington naval, aviation, 
and troops in its backyard including Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Thus, internal balancing 
in the case of China is aimed at managing domestic social and political unrests by reinforcing 
military capabilities in order to prevent any escalations over its borders. 
Arms sales are  used as a  foreign policy instrument in International  relations arena 
during the period of the post-Cold War. While the post-Cold War era has tended to bring 
countries closer one to another on political, economic, and social level, it does not necessary 
dissipate the perception of threats between nations that nurture grievances toward each other 
for decades. The response to such threat, in some cases, consists of purchasing arms to deter 
rivals. Such an intention of a state to dissuade its foes by buying arms can be interpreted as a 
foreign policy instrument. For instance, while the U.S. had been delaying the purchase order of 
advanced medium range air-to-air missiles (AMRAAM), beyond visual range  air-to-air (BVRAAM), 
that Taiwan had placed for years, the U.S. only consented to complete the sale and delivered 
the missiles after China displayed its newly purchase of the Russian-made AA-12, considered 
by Defense Technical Information (DTI) as sophisticated as its other version AA-X-12 (Hewitt, 
Waltz, and Vandiviere, 2002). Thus, at some extent, the United States and Russia 
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continue to utilize arms sales as a tool of foreign policy to settle their political divergence. While 
Robert S. Ross (2002) argues that the U.S. arms sales to Taiwan show Washington support to 
the independence of Taiwan, Johnston Alastair Iain (2003) justifies the China’s militarization as 
aiming at the reunification of Taiwan. Thus, while American arms sales to Taiwan, Japan and 
South Korea  increase, Russian arms sales to  its Asian partners including China,  India,  and 
Vietnam grow, as well. It is interesting to find out whether Russian arms sales to China between 
2000 and 2013 upset the balance of military power between Russia and the United States in 
East and Southeast Asia. 
American and Russian arms sales to Asia raise concerns. While some scholars and analysts 
(Garnett, 2001; Wishnick, 2001; Lo, 2004) view China’s purchase of arms from Russia as a policy 
aiming at reinforce its domestic and territorial integrity, others (Shambaugh, 2005 and 2013; 
Mearsheimer, 2010; Cohen, 1976) believe that China’s military buildups upset the balance of 
military power in the Asian region. Their argument is based on the fact that an expanding 
Chinese military capabilities has the potential of heightening regional territorial and Islands 
disputes between China and its neighbors, namely Taiwan. From China’s perspective, the 
choice of the United States to reinforce its military partnership with China’s traditional 
neighbors including Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea, is perceived as provocation and a way to 
contain China’s economic and military development (Barron, 2001-2002). Thus, the balance of 
military power, as noted Mearsheimer (2010), is upset in East and Southeast Asia when the 
volume of one country’s arms purchased is significantly larger than that of other countries in 
the region. Mearsheimer’s findings, however, seem not take into considerations the quality of 
Russian arms purchased by Chinese. 
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Although the volume of arms China has purchased from Russia is significant, the quality 
of these arms is low according to the Western Conventional Arms Control Regime (WCACR). 
The inventory of the People’s Liberation Army, as stated by Ronald O’Rourke (2011), included 
Russian-made older generations of fighters, Tanks, and submarines purchased in 1990s. While 
the focus of O’Rourke is on the Chinese military modernization, he finds that despites Beijing’s 
effort to expand its military capabilities, the discrepancy between the quality and the quantity 
of weapons is huge. He then concludes that the gap between quality and quantity of weapons 
and human resources remains the fundamental weakness of the PLA. 
The superiority of military capabilities of American allies including Japan, South Korea, 
and Taiwan in East and Southeast Asia remains unquestionable. Thus the possibility for China to 
disrupt the balance of military power in East and Southeast Asia remains disputable.  The 
superiority of military capabilities of American allies (Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan) in East 
and Southeast Asia is interesting. While the Japanese constitution renounces war, conforming 
to its article 9 (Hughes, 2006), the Japan-United States military alliance based on the American 
defense of the Island since the end of the World War II remains intact. This military cooperation 
remains crucial to Tokyo as it helps enhance its amphibious capacity in the Self-Defence Force 
(SDF), should Japan come under amphibious attacks from its Southwestern coast. Thus, Japan is 
well equipped with some high-tech arms including MK-45-4 127mm (Naval gun), SAM System, 
KC-767 GTTA (Tanker/Transport ac), AN/SPY-1D (Air search radar), and BGM-71 TOW (Anti- 
tank missile). Furthermore, the superiority of American military partners in East and Southeast 
Asia can be perceived through the inventories of South Korea and Taiwan. These two countries 
benefit from the newly produced American fifth generation of F-35s, for which purchase orders 
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are limited to America’s closest allies in Asia (Cabestan, 2014). It also should be mentioned the 
existence of F-16s among these inventories. This suggest that the U.S. relies on the quality of its 
arms sold to partners in Asia to balance Russian arms sales in this region. 
Russia prefers to sell its most sophisticated weapons to India. Considered as the major 
arms supplier to China and India, the military inventory of Russian weapons held by India is 
qualitatively remarkable than that of China. Thus, while Moscow refutes to sell its Sukhois SU- 
30s (fourth generation fighters) to Beijing, as pointed Kapila (2012), yet Russia accepts to sell 
these weapons to New Delhi. The rationale goes on saying that, not only does Russia sells its 
more advanced weapons to India, Moscow also prefers to transfer a lager quantity of its 
weapons to India than to China. This preference, according to Kapila (2012), is based on the 
1971 Indo-Soviet “Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation”, which explains Russia’s special 
treatment toward India. The content of this treaty, as Kapila pointed out, aimed at containing 
China and Pakistan. It also suggested that while New Delhi continued to enjoy the Indo- 
Soviet/Russian military relations, India had to stay away from any strategic alliances with China, 
or western powers, including the United States. 
Moreover, the Indo-Soviet Treaty is a strategic alliance on the ground of strategic 
benefits for the Soviets. Besides the containment of China, and depriving Beijing of taking 
advantage of becoming Asian regional power, Russia viewed in the Indo-Soviet Treaty an 
opportunity to undermine the American clout in the Asian region. Thus, Kapila (2012) continues 
stating that Russia needed India’s status as a spearhead of the non-aligned movement to 
strengthen Soviet foreign policy in non-developed nations. Furthermore, a declined American 
influence in Asia would be an opportunity for Russia to be more comfortable in the region to fill 
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the gap as weapons supplier. However, it must be brought to attention the potential turmoil 
that would occur between Mainland China and Taiwan in the instance of Washington’s decline 
from the Asia-Pacific. 
An increase in military expenditure as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) of a state 
is a signal of threat and potential disruption of the balance of military power. The military 
expenditure is important to help the administration of a State to provide for the necessary 
service and asset in order to protect and serve the security of the public. Conversely, while the 
military expenditure is significant for the above mentioned reason, its increase in a country 
could also suggest a sensation of threat of this country (Dunne, Smith, and Willenbockel, 2004). 
The argument goes saying that the greater the threat, the higher the military expenditure of 
the neighbouring countries. So, the smaller the threat, the lower the military expenditure of the 
neighbouring countries. As a result, the military expenditure, as Deger and Smith (1983) point 
out, contributes to shift the balance of military power in a region. Thus, this thesis will examine 
the military expenditure of Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, China, India, and Vietnam to determine 
to what extent their military expenditure constitutes a threat to their neighbours, hence leads 
to the balance of military power in East and Southeast Asia. 
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Chapter 3: Methods 
 
This study used a mixed methods approach to understand the implications of Russian 
and American arms sales in East and Southeast Asia. Descriptive statistics and comparative case 
study analysis were used for the purpose of “cross-unit comparison where both qualitative and 
quantitative comparisons are generally made” (Jensen and Rodgers, 2001). This study utilized 
data of International Arms Transfers’ database from the Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute (SIPRI). This international Institute is independent and a valuable source of 
academic data for researchers, and policymakers. 
The sample drawn from this database encompassed China, India, Vietnam, Japan, 
Taiwan, and South Korea. Thus, this study relied on second sources data. Data of Russian arms 
sales to China, India, and Vietnam; and that of American arms sales to Japan, Taiwan, and South 
Korea, were compared in a case study approach to determine these nations’ military 
capabilities. The military capabilities included the quality and quantity of weapons sold, and the 
military expenditure of each country of this sample. The data on quality of American and 
Russian arms sales to their Asian military partners were collected from archives, mainly 
consulted online at the library of the University of Kansas. Thus, I consulted the 2014 Annual 
Report to Congress on Military and Security Developments (CMSD) involving the People’s 
Republic of China. I also consulted documents from the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies (CSIS). Moreover, used data from SIPRI to generate trends and types of arms purchased. 
Furthermore, I checked the types of arms purchased in this study against criteria on 
generations of arms (based on Western Conventional Arms Control Regime, WCACR) described 
in  the  2014  Annual  Report  to  CMSD.  I  also  utilized  measurement  under  the  Western 
18  
Conventional Arms Control regime as suggested by the National Air and Space Intelligence 
Center (NASIC). According to the NASIC, when it comes to define the age (or the quality) of 
fighters, there are two categories: legacy fighters and modern fighters. While legacy fighters 
encompass fighter aircraft under the WCACR of third generation or below, modern fighters 
include combat aircraft of fourth generation and above. It is important to note the difference 
between the Western and the Chinese classification of fighter generations. While for example 
the Russian SU-30 falls under the WCACR of the fourth generation, the People’s Liberation 
Army considers it as a third generation fighter aircraft. The reason behind such a discrepancy is 
blurring, given that China is more inclined to indigenize its aircraft, hence, moves away from 
western convention that might ‘undermine’ the security and military capabilities of Beijing. 
Finally, I used descriptive analysis of data that I found from the documents to determine the 
quality of arms sales by country. To measure Russian and American arms sales to their Asian 
partners, SIPRI uses Trend Indicator Value (TIV), unique system generated by SIPRI to analyze 
the volume of international transfers of major weapons. According to the SIPRI, the TIV 
represents “unit production cost of a core set of weapons and is intended to represent the 
transfer of military resources rather than the financial values of the transfer.”3 In this thesis, the 
 
TIV allowed me to generate and examine trends of American and Russian arms sales to their 
Asian military partners, respectively. Moreover, I exploited data collection from academic 
literature related to the quality of arms purchased by each of these six Eastern and 






3       
See    “http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/production/researchissues/measuring_aprod.” 
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Furthermore, I used unclassified American government publications including the 
United States Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) 2014 annual reports on the People’s Liberation 
Army, and the 2014 Congressional Research Service (CRS) that  addressed topics regarding 
Chinese military capabilities in Asia. This unclassified literature reviewed the background of 
American and Chinese military capabilities in air, sea, and land domain. I was able to identify 
and analyze Quality versus Quantity of American and Russian weapons sold through the Word 
Bank, and Jane’s Defence weekly databases. It is important to mention that while I used data 
from SIPRI to examine the quantity of arms sales between countries in this study, other 
aforementioned literature sources have helped me to examine the quality of arms sales. 
Case Sample Selection 
 
This thesis focused on arms sales to East and Southeast Asia by Russia and the U.S., 
former rivals of the Cold War. Russia sells most of weapons to its Asian military partners 
including India, China, and Vietnam, while the United States continues to supply, in the same 
region, Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea. I chose these six countries for three reasons. First, 
these six arms importers were listed among the 2013 top ten of American or Russian arms 
importers in Asia, according to SIPRI. Second, I chose China because its military rise turns 
spotlights on the People’s Liberation Army, and I was interested to know whether the Chinese 
military really has the quality of military structures to shift the balance of military power, and 
hence assume a superior status on the regional and international arena. Finally, I am curious 
and fascinated by how these former intimate competitors of the Cold War –Moscow and 
Washington- use arms sales to their Asian military allies as a foreign policy instrument on the 




The present study refers to three different hypotheses in order to test the assumed 
relationship between the key dependent and independent variables: 
H1: Russian arms sales to China have disrupted the balance of military power in East and 
Southeast Asia. 
H2: The U.S. sales modern arms to Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea and disrupts the balance of 
military power in East and Southeast Asia. 




I used the Western category of fighter, navy, and missile generations to determine the 
quality of arms sold, knowing that the Western Conventional Arms Control Regime (WCACR) 
uses World War II as reference to determine the age or quality of weapons. That is, all weapons 
produced prior or during the World War II are considered by the WCACR as weapons of first 
generation. Thus, I was able to determine the quality of the arms sold to each country in this 
study. Then, I compared Quality with Quantity in order to determine the real value of these 
arms. The balance of military power would be upset by China’s arms purchased from Russia if 
the PLA had more modern (fourth generation or newer) and a larger amount of arms, and had a 
higher rate of share of GDP. If China fitted one or two of these variables (or conditions) and the 
other variables were filled by other countries in the sample, then the balance of military power 
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was maintained in Asia. If another country besides China filled all the criteria, I determined that 
that country upsets the balance of military power. 
To calculate the quality level of military capabilities of each country in this study, 
I applied the estimated number of modern arms that I found in the literature to the quantity of 
these sold arms by the United States and Russia to their allies, respectively. Thus, I used the 
formula: Tm = T x Nm%, where Tm is total modern arms, T means total arms held by country, 
and Nm% is percent number of modern arms purchased. For example, the number of modern 
Russian ships bought and held by the People’s Liberation Army’s in 2000-13 was calculated as 
follows: 4270 x 27% = 1152.9. Thus, China’s military has a total of 4270 ships, of which 27 
percent are of 4th generation and newer, meaning about 1,153. Although, the percentage of 
quality  of  arms  purchased  for  Japan,  India,  Taiwan,  South  Korea,  and  Vietnam  were  not 
available in the SIPRI’s database, key scholarly literatures, including the 2014 Annual Report to 
Congress on Military and Security Developments (CMSD) involving the People’s Republic of 
China, reports from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), have been helpful 
to address the analysis of the quality level of arms purchase of the aforementioned countries. 
For example, from the literature helped me find that from 2000 to 2013, China purchased 27 
percent of modern aircraft, 56 percent of modern missiles, and 27 percent of ships from Russia. 
I calculated the quantity of aircrafts, missiles, or ships sold to China, India, Vietnam, 
Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan from 2000 to 2013 by adding the yearly number of aircrafts, 
missiles, or ships sold to each country during the same period using the following formula: T = 
ty1 + ty2 + ty3…+ ty14, where ty means total yearly purchased, and ty1 is total yearly purchased 
in year 1 (2000), ty2 is total yearly purchased in year 2 (2001), and ty14 is total purchased in 
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year 14 (2013). For instance, the total number of aircrafts purchased from 2000 to 2013 was 
calculated as follows: TA= tay1 + tay2+ tay3 +…tay14, where TA means Total Aircraft purchased, 
and tay1 + tay2+ tay3 +…tay14 is the total sum of aircrafts purchased during 14 years. To 
calculate the number of troops for each of these six countries, I just considered the total 
number of troops documented for the last year of this study (2013). 
To determine the military expenditure of these nations, I calculated the average of 
fourteen years of money spent on military as a share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). To 
calculate the average of the military expenditure (Av. MilExp) for each country (China, India, 
Vietnam, Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea), I added the yearly among of GDP of the country and 
divided the yearly total amount of GDP by 14 (the number of years covered by this study) using 
the formula: 
Av. MilExp. =  GDP1 + GDP2 + GDP3 …..+ GDP13 
14 
where GDP1 means Gross Domestic Product for year 2000, and GDP13 is Gross Domestic 
Product for year 2013. To highlight changes (increase or decrease) in the military expenditure of 
the countries in this thesis, I calculated the percent change from year 2000 to 2013 using the 
formula: 
Percent Change = Difference/Original X 100, where Difference is merely the result from 
subtracting the smaller number from the larger number. The Original is the starting number. 
For instance to calculate the percent increase for the Taiwanese military expenditure that was 
10385 in year 2000, and 10530 in year 2013; I preceded as follows: 
Percent increase = 10530 – 10385 x 100 
10385 
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= 1.4 % 
 
 
Thus, from 2000 to 2013, the Taiwanese military expenditure has increased by 1.4 percent. The 





Chapter 4: Results and Analysis 
 
Table 1. Quantity of Arms and number of Troops by Country, 2000-2013 
 
 
Country Aircraft Missile Ship Troop 
Japan 3128 633 56 259800 
South Korea 7733 1262 1115 659500 
Taiwan 1250 1001 1150 - - 
India 16845 4466 5205 2728700 
China 14989 4849 4270 2993000 
Vietnam 1478 574 1074 522000 
 
 
Sources: The World Bank and SIPRI Arms Transfers Database 
Table 1 shows that while China had more aircrafts than Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, and 
Taiwan, Russia sold more aircrafts and ships to India than the U.S. sold Aircraft and Ships to 
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Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Furthermore, the quantity of Russian aircrafts and ships 
purchased by India was larger than that of China and Vietnam. This suggests that Russia has 
sold more planes and ships to India than it has to China from 2000 to 2013. Such a discrepancy 
in quantity of Russian arms sales to India and China suggests that Russia is contributing to 
either shifting the balance of military power in favor of India, or maintaining the balance 
military power in the region, as claimed by Kapila (2012). 
Moreover, among the United States’ military allies in this study, Table 1 shows that 
military capabilities including the quantity of aircrafts and missiles of South Korea was higher 
than that of Japan or Taiwan, altogether. Nevertheless, the quantity of American ships sold to 
Taiwan was larger than that of Japan and South Korea, together. This suggested that South 
Korea was one of the U.S.’s key Asian partners. The difference in number of troops between 
Chinese and Indian military was not significant. However, while it was difficult to compare the 
number of Taiwanese troops (due to missing data) with troops of the rest of the countries in 




Table 2: Quality of Arms Sales to Country, 2000-2013 
 
 
Country Aircraft Missile Ship Quality Level 
China 0 1 0 1 
India 1 1 0 2 
Vietnam 1 1 0 2 
Japan 1 1 1 3 
Taiwan 1 1 1 3 
South Korea 1 1 1 3 
 
Sources (Multiple): 
- National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) 
- Center of Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 
-The 2014 U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) 
-The 2014 Report to Congress on Military and Security Development (CMSD) 
-The World Bank database 
-IHS Jane's Defence Weekly 
Notes: 
a) For the purpose of this thesis, the quality level of arms is 0 when the number of type of arms 
purchased from 2000 to 2013 contains 50 percent or less of modern arms. The quality level is 1 when 
the number of type of arms purchased from 2000 to 2013 contains more than 50 percent of modern 
arms. Thus, 0 is the lowest quality level, and 3 is the highest. 
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b) For the purpose of this thesis, all arms created in late 1990s to 2013 and equipped with 
advanced military technology are considered modern. 
 
 
Quality of arms sales to country 
 
-China and quality of Russian arms purchased 
 
Efforts are being made by China toward the modernization of China’s military 
capabilities. While the 2014 Congressional Research Service (CSR) expected that 75 percent of 
the People’s Liberation Army will be modern by 2020 (O’Rourke, 2014), it is interesting to know 
the account for modern arms that China had purchased from Russian from 2000 to 2013. 
Aircraft: The Russian aircraft sold to China from 2000 to 2013 were mostly of an older 
generation. The inventory of the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) consists of 27 
percent modern Russian aircrafts (Chase et al., 2015), including the SU-30MK/Flanker (Combat 
fighter); Ka-27PL/Helix-A (ASW helicopter); II-76M/Candid-B (Transport aircraft); and Mi- 
8MT/MI-17/Hip-H (Helicopter) to name a few. The Chinese air force has made some 
modifications on a few older generation of Russian-made SU-27s from its inventory to turn 
them into J-11, advanced generation fighters.4 Despites the larger number of Russian legacy 
fighters, 73 percent of old generation of combat aircrafts, a few were still capable of carrying 
missiles. 
Missiles: Russian missiles sold to China from 2000 to 2013 were mostly modern. A 
missile is modern, according to Western convention, when it is from second generation and 







stated that Beijing had the most modernized, active and diverse missile expansion on the planet 
(NASIC, 2013). Thus, 56 percent of the missiles China has purchased from Russia were modern. 
They included 48N6E2/SA-10E (SAM); RVV-AE/AA-12 Adder BVRAAM; 9M311/SA-19(SAM); and 
3M-54Klub/SS-N-27(Anti-Ship MI/SSM 
 
Ships: Most ships China has bought from Russia were obsolete. The People’s Liberation 
Army Navy (PLAN) had only 27 percent modern Russian ships purchased from 2000 to 2013, 
including Project-636E/Kilo (Submarine) and Project-956/Sovremenny (Destroyer). 
- India and quality of Russian arms sales 
 
Aircraft: Most aircraft India has purchased from Russia were modern. More than 50 
percent of the Russian aircraft purchased by the Indian Air Force (IAF) from 2000 to 2013 were 
fourth generation or newer, including SU-30MK/Flanker (Fighter); and Fighter Ground Attack 
aircrafts such as T-50 PAKFA, and MiG-29SMT/Fulcrum-F; and II-38/MAY (ASW aircraft). 
Although the II-38/May was a second-hand, it has been modernized by India5. 
Missiles: While some of Russian missiles were produced in India under Russian license 
and technology, the majority of Indian missiles purchased from Moscow were modern. The 
inventory included Anti-tank missiles, such as 9M119Svir/AT-11, and 9M113Konkurs /AT-5; 
Surface-to-Surface and Air-to-Surface missiles, such as PJ-10BrahMos SSM/ASM to name a few. 
Ships: All of the ships India has purchased from Russia from 2000 to 2013 were obsolete, 
and consisted of Project-1241/Tarantul (Fast Attacks Craft). 
- Vietnam and quality of Russian arms purchased 
 
 
5       
See    <http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/production/researchissues/measuring_aprod>. 
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Aircraft: The Vietnamese air force has purchased more than 50 percent of high quality 
of Russian arms from 2000 to 2013. The aircraft was mostly consisted of SU-30MK/Flanker 
(Combat fighter). 
Missiles: Most of the missiles that Vietnam has purchased from Russia from 2000 to 
2013 were modern. The list included Igla-1/SA-16 (Portable SAM); Kh-35Uran/SS-N-25 (ASM); R- 
73/AA-11 (SRAAM); and AS/ASW torpedo. 
Ships: Nearly all of the ships that Vietnam has purchased from Russia were obsolete. 
 
They consisted of Project-1241/Tarantul, and BPS-500/Type-1241A (FAC). 
 
- Japan and quality of American arms purchased 
 
Aircraft: The inventory of the Japanese aircraft purchased from the United States from 
2000 to 2013 encompassed a mix of old and modern arms. However, more than 50 percent of 
the aircraft were of high quality, including F-35A (JSF); TH-28/480 (Light helicopter); and AH- 
64D Apache (Combat helicopter). 
Missiles: There were a blend of obsolete and modern generations of American missiles 
that Japan has purchased from the U.S. However, more than 50 percent were modern, including 
BVRAAM (Beyond-Visual-Range-Air-to-Air Missile; BGM-71 Tow (Anti-tank missile); MIM-104F 
PAC-3; JDAM (Joint Direct Attack Munition); and GMLRS (Guided-Multiple Launch Rocket 
System). 
Ships: All of the Japanese ships purchased from the U.S. from 2000 to2013 were modern. 
They were mostly LCAC (Landing Craft Air Cushion). 
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-Taiwan and quality of American arms purchased 
 
Aircraft: The majority of the aircrafts that Taiwan has purchased from the United States 
from 2000 to 2013 was modern, although there were a few obsolete planes. The aircraft 
included AH-64D Apache, and AH-1W Super Cobra, (both are Combat helicopters); and P-3Cup 
Orion (ASW aircraft). 
Missiles: all the American missiles that Taiwan has purchased were modern. There were 
MIM-104F PAC-3 (Anti-Ballistic Missile); AGM-114K Hellfire (Anti-tank missile 2010); RGM-84L 
Harpon-2 (Anti-ship MI/SSM); and AIM-102C AMRAAMBVRAAM, to name a few. 
Ships: More than 50 percent of the Taiwanese ships bought from the United States 
from 2000 to 2013 were modern. The inventory included Anchorage and Perry. 
-South Korea and quality of American arms purchased 
 
Aircraft: All of American aircraft that South Korea has purchased from 2000 to 2013 
were modern. Some were produced or assembled in South Korea under American license. This 
category included F-16Block-52Version; F-16D; and FK-16. The rest of the inventory 
encompassed AH-64D Apache (Combat helicopter); F-15E Strike Eagle (Combat fighter); 
Shadow-400 (UAV); and RH-800RA/SIG (Reconnaissance AC). 
Missiles: Nearly all of South Korean missiles purchased from the United States from 
2000 to 2013 were modern. There were models including FIM-92 Stinger (Portable SAM); AIM- 
9X Sidewinder (SRAAM); Paveway (Guided Bomb); RGM-84L Harpon-2 (Anti-ship MI/SSM); 
Standard Missile-2MRSAM; and AGM-65 Maverick (ASM). 
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Ships: All of American ships that South Korea has purchased from the U.S. were modern, 
including Anchorage and Perry. 
Table 3. Military Expenditure as a Share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by Country, 2000-13 
 
 
Country Military Exp. In 2000 
in US $ Million 
Military Exp. In 2013 
In US $ Million 
Share of GDP, 2000- 
13 
Japan 60,288 48,604 1 % 
South Korea 20,031 33,937 3 % 
Taiwan 10,385 10,530 2.3 % 
India 27,653 47,653 3 % 
China 37,040 188,460 2.1 % 
Viet Nam - 3,387 2 % 
 
 
Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure database 
 
The average of 14 years (2000-2013) of the military share of gross domestic product for 
Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, China, India, and Vietnam are illustrated on Table 3. While there 
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was missing data for Vietnam for year 2000, Table 3 shows the military expenditure for the rest 
of the countries encompassed in this thesis. The unit for the military expenditure was in United 
States dollars. There was an increase in the military expenditure of China, India, and Taiwan 
from 2000 to 2013. But the military expenditure of Japan has significantly declined. The Japanese 
share of GDP was the lowest of this sample,  (1%). This suggested the Japanese complied 
with the Article 9 of their constitution, which stipulates the country does not militarize (Hughes, 
2006). 
It is critical to point out that despite the decrease in the Japanese military expenditure 
(from $ 60,288 in 2000 to $ 48,604 in 2013), Japan has a higher military expenditure, but this 
increase in not relative to GDP, and compared to that of South Korea, Taiwan, India, and 
Vietnam. In contrast, the Chinese military expenditure from 2000 to 2013 has quintupled, while 
it only accounted for 2.1 % of GDP. Such discrepancies suggested that an increase in China’s 
military expenditure did not necessary mean that China’s military capability was growing. 
However, when one closely looked at the percent increase in China’s military expenditure from 
year 2000 with $37,040 to year 2013 with $188,460, the result was striking (See Table 3). China 
has registered 409 percent increase in its military expenditure. Such a percent increase was 
noteworthy and more likely to be perceived by China’s neighboring countries as a threat to 
their security (World Bank, 2002). 
Additionally, while the percent increase of military expenditure for South Korea was 69 
percent, India has recorded 72 percent of percent increase in its military expenditure from 
2000-13, suggesting that India and South Korea were respectively ranked the second and third 
country in military expenditure, preceded by China. Besides missing data for Vietnam’s military 
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expenditure for year 2000, making it difficult to calculate the percent change for this country, 
Japan was the only country in this study to record a percent decrease. The percent decrease is 
the difference between the original amount ($60,288) and the last amount ($48,604) divided by 
the original amount, multiplied per 100. Thus, Japan had a percent decrease in its military 
expenditure of 19 percent from 2000 to 2013. 
The Japanese article 9 states discourages any maintenance of aircrafts, ships, missiles or 
other war potential. The article 9 goes on by stating that the right of belligerence of Japan will 
not be acknowledged (Hughes, 2006). Thus, that the Japanese military expenditure from 2000 
to 2013 was the lowest among the United States military partners in this study (Table 3) was 
consistent of the Japanese share of gross domestic product for the same time frame. This 
finding, which was presented through trends on arms sales to countries on (Figure 2). 
The trends of Russian arms sales to its Asian partners in this study were remarkably 
disparate (Figure 1). Figure 1 shows that the arms race between China and India was significant, 
knowing that from 2000 to 2001 Russian arms sales to China increased, but rapidly decreased 
between 2001 and 2003. However, Russia increased its arms sales to India beginning in 2000 to 
2003, with a slight superiority over China’s arms purchases. Russian arms sales to India 
encountered some periods of decreases in 2005, and 2008. 
Meanwhile, China significantly increased its Russian arms purchases from 2003 to 2007. 
Such an important increase suggests that the admission of China to the World Trade 
Organization in December 2001 had positive impacts on China's arms trades with Russia, given 
that, as mentioned by Phillip Saunders (2006), both countries tried to undermine the influence of the 
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United States in that part of the world. However, from 2009 to 2013, the volume of Russian arms 
sales to India took off drastically. The increase in volume of Russian arms sales to India at the 
same time it decreased arms sales to China suggests that Moscow, as a supplier, used arms as a 
leverage to maintain the balance of military power in the Asian region (Agadzhanyan, 2012). It 
also suggests that Russia’s arms sales to China do not upset the balance of military power in the 
Asian region as pointed out by Mearsheimer (2010). Moreover, Figure 1 shows that Russian 
arms sales to Vietnam were steady from 2000 to 2010 with some timid increases in 2001, 2005, 
and 2008. However, Russian arms sales to Vietnam have taken off in 2010 with a peak at the 
onset of 2011, but decreased from then to 2013. Thus, Russian arms sales to Vietnam have not 
had significant implications on the balance of military power in East and Southeast Asia. 
Furthermore, Figure 2 shows trends of American arms sales to Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. 
Trends of American arms sales (see Figure 2) to Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan were 
diversely distributed. There was a significant increase in trends of American arms sales to 
South Korea than to Taiwan and Japan, creating important gaps in Trend Indicator Value (TIV) 
between these three Asian military partners of Washington. For instant the greatest gaps in TIV 
between South Korea and Taiwan occurred in 2007 when South Korea advanced Taiwan by 
about $ 1200 million in TIV. About the same value was notices between South Korea and Japan 
in 2013 when the former advanced the latter (Figure 2). While American arms sales to Japan, 
South Korea, and Taiwan have decreased from 2000 to 2002 for South Korea, and 2003 for 
Taiwan, the sales picked up for both countries from these years respectively to reach a peak in 

























Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database 
 
Between 2005 and 2013, the trend of American arms sales to South Korea was 
characterized by periods of sharply decreases, especially during the periods between 2006 and 
2009, and 2011 and 2013 (Figure 2). However, periods between 2005 and 2006, and 2009 and 
2011 have been characterized by important increases in American arms sales to South Korea. 
Meanwhile, from 2003 to 2013, American arms sales to Taiwan have decreased between 2005 
and 2007, before encountering a period of steadiness from 2007 until after 2009. Nevertheless, 
arms sales have increased from the United States to Taiwan between 2003 and 2005, and 2009 
and 2013.  Figure 2, also shows trends of American arms sales to Japan. This sales were mostly 
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steady throughout the 14 years covered by this thesis with some timid period of decreases in 
2002 to 2005, and from 2008 to 2013. 






















Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers database 
 
From 2004 to 2008 the trend of the Japanese arms purchase from the United States has 
increased. Thus, while Figure 2 shows that the trend of American arms sales to South Korea was 
more important and has created noteworthy gaps between South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan, 
Figure 3 is more illustrative as it allows one to compare the volume of American and Russian 
arms sales to their Asian military partners in this thesis. Thus, Figure 3 shows American and 



































Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers database 
 
Trends comparison of American and Russian arms sales to their respective partners and 
allies in the Asian region (see Figure 3) shows that while China’s arms purchase increased from 
2000 to 2007 -leaving remarkable gaps between Vietnam, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan-, 
India closed the gaps and created another one between itself and the rest of the 
aforementioned countries by increasing Russian arms purchase from 2009 to 2013. Moreover, 
Figure 3 shows that the volume of China’s arms purchase from 2000 to late 2003, and from 
mid-2003 to mid-2006 were the largest compared to the rest of American and Russian military 
partners encompassed in this thesis. However, India’s arms purchases from 2009 to 2013 have 
significantly outsized arms purchases of the rest the countries.  The wax and wane in volume of 
2013 
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Russian arms purchases between New Delhi and Beijing suggests that India tried to avoid arms 
discrepancy between itself and China. It also suggest that Russia has maintained the balance of 
military power in that region by adjusting its arms sales to both India and China. 
Table 4: Arms Sales and Implications on the Balance of Military power in East and Southeast 
Asia 
 








of Mil. Power 
China 24,108 NO 2.1 % NO 
India 26,516 NO 3 % NO 
Vietnam 3,126 NO 2 % NO 
Japan 3,817 YES 1 % NO 
Taiwan 3,401 YES 2.3 % NO 
South Korea 10,110 YES 3 % NO 
 
 
Note: “Quantity of Arms” in Table 4 consists of the total of aircrafts, missiles, and ships purchased by 
country. “High Quality of Arms” refers to highest outcomes of Quality Level (see Table 2). “Disruption of 
the Balance of Military Power” is the outcome that derives from the quantity, quality, and military 
expenditure for each country. 
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Chapter 5: Discussion 
The key factors that enable a country to disrupt the balance of military power in a 
region lie in the combination of the increase in the military expenditure, quantity and high 
quality of arms purchased or held by this country. While China is often pointed by some 
policymakers and its neighbors as causing the disruption of the balance of military power in 
Asia because of its military expansion characterized by an increase in Russian arms purchase, 
the findings in thesis show inconsistency with such argument. Among Russian military partners 
in this study, China, India, and Vietnam, the larger quantity of Russian arms sales from 2000 to 
2013 went to India (26,516), not China (24,108), as shown on Table 4. This discrepancy in 
quantity of Russian arms sales to India and China suggests that Russia has contributed to either 
shifting the balance of military power in favor of India, or maintaining the balance of military 
power in the region, as claimed by Kapila (2012). Therefore, my first hypothesis of this thesis 
stating that Russian arms sales to China have increased the quantity of China’s arms and upset 
the balance of military power in Asia does not hold. Moreover, the quality of Russian arms 
purchased by China were questionable. 
Russian arms sold to China were mostly obsolete. This is the second finding of this 
thesis. In fact, much attentions seem too focused on the quantity of Russian arms sold to China 
from 2000 to 2013 that one overlooks that the importance of arms, as Shambaugh (2000) and 
Shlykov (2004) observed, entails their quality in combat (2000). Unlikely, Russian arms that 
China purchased were deprived of required quality, and hence inefficient for combat. While, in 
this thesis, three (3) was the score of quality level required for arms to be considered high 
quality or modern, the quality level (see Table 2) of China’s arms purchased from Russia was 
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only one (1). This score was attributed to china because only Russian missiles bought by China 
in 2000 to 2013 were modern. 
In addition to the quantity and quality of China’s arms purchased from Russia, China’s 
military expenditure as a share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was believed to be 
significantly high, and hence a disruptive factor to the balance of military power in East and 
Southeast Asia. However, this study shows that China only accounted for an average of 2.1 
percent of GDP, and has one of the lowest GDP in this study. Such a small amount of GDP 
suggests that China is not in position to shift the balance of military power in East and Southeast 
Asia, leading thus to my next finding in this thesis. Despite China’s low military expenditure 
from 2000 to 2013, the percent increase in China’s military expenditure was 409 percent during 
the time frame. This salient increase suggests that China spent a significant part of its military 
expenditure on other aspects of its armed forces other than arms purchases. Moreover, this 
finding suggests that China had (an) other arms supplier(s) besides Russia. 
Notwithstanding the large quantity of Russian arms sold to its Asian military partners in 
this study, the U.S.’s arms sold to Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea were modern. This finding 
shows that not only the Asian region is of American concerns, but also policymakers in 
Washington are aware of the importance of the quality superiority of arms over quantity in 
instance of defense and combat. Moreover, this finding corroborates my second assumption for 
this thesis, asserting that the United States sold modern arms to Japan, Taiwan, and South 
Korea. Additionally, another relevant finding is that despites its article 9 of the Constitution that 
recommends to Japan not to militarize, this country had more modern arms, including fifth 
generation of Joint Strike Fighters, F-35s,  than Taiwan- a militarized country. While the dividing 
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line between defense and combat arms is blurring in International relations (a point outside the 
scope of this thesis), the purchase of F-35s by the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) could be 
explained by territorial and Island disputes that involves Japan with its neighbors, including 
China, in the case of disputes over Senkaku/Diaoyu. Thus, Japan needs some modern arms to 
defend its regional interests, even if the presence of these high tech arms serve as deterrence 
to Japan’s rivals in the Asian region. Finally, the finding on South Korea is the one that impresses 
me the most in this thesis. 
The increase in American modern arms sales to South Korea reinforces American 
presence in East and Southeast Asia. This finding could be considered as the key one, given that 
South Korea is, in the words of Hillary Rodham Clinton, “an advanced democracy and key ally 
living in the shadow of a repressive and bellicose neighbor to the north” (2014). Thus, the 
increase in modern arms sold to South Korea finds some explanations in the belligerent behavior 
of a nuclearized North Korea. This country’s obstinacy to continue its nuclear program despite 
the Six-Party Talks (SPT) led by China, and including North Korea, South Korea, China, the 
United States, Japan, and Russia (Chou, 2005), the regime of Pyongyang is source of security and 
stability concerns to Asia and the rest of the world. The choice of China to lead the SPT was based 
on the close relationship between Pyongyang and Beijing. According to Marc Lanteigne (2013), 
China is the North Korean only main economic support. The argument goes on stating, for 
instance, that from 2005 and 2011 trades between both countries went from US$1.5 billion to 
6.3 billion. Despites the increase in economic trades, friendship, and the choice of its closest 
partner (China) to run the SPT, North Korea did not refrain from the 2006, 2009, and 2013 
nuclear tests. Such provocative behavior of the regime of Pyongyang could explain the reason 
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why Washington reinforced its military presence in the Asian region, and strengthen South 
Korea’s with more arms. Such a U.S. behavior toward North Korea by increasing arms sales to 
South Korea underscored the use arms sales as a foreign policy tool by the United States. It is 
important to note that both North Korea and China share the same goal in terms of territorial 
disputes as both states aim at the reunification of their countries. In other words, while North 
Korea wants to take the South Korea back, China also want to take Taiwan back (Johnston, 
2003). Figures 2 and 4 show evidence of increase in American arms sales to South Korea in 2006 
and 2010 following the first two nuclear tests (in 2006 and 2009) by North Korea. This reaction 
from the U.S., which itself was another example of American foreign policy behavior in Asia, 
suggests that the United States cannot afford to lose its interests and allies in that part of the 
world to an unpopular nuclearized North Korea. 
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Additionally, by the end of 2009  to mid-2012, South Korea has increased its arms 
purchases from the United States, surpassing those of Vietnam, Japan, Taiwan, and China. This 
suggests the implementation of the military facet of America’s ‘pivot’ to Asia as Washington 
continues, according to Mearsheimer, to act “as a pacifier in this part of the world” (2010). 
America’s ‘pivot’ to Asia is a strategy of an adjustment in American foreign policy toward Asia, 
which consists of increasing the presence of American naval forces, hence reinforcing American 
defense relations with countries in the Asian region (Ross, 2012). The defense  relations between 
the U.S. and its Asian allies is more visible through the importance of American arms sold to 
South Korea. Such significant arms trades with South Korea suggest that the U.S. transmit the 
task of the Asian “pacifier” to an Asian country, namely South Korea for the sake of the pivot. 
The choice of South Korea to convey the American pivot to Asia is another key finding in 
the thesis. 
It is important to mention that this study has encountered some limitations. First, the 
selection of a small sample size. The selection of this small sample size was based on 
observation of trends in international arms sales from SIPRI arms transfers’ database. Thus, 
from 2000 to 2013, India, China, and Vietnam were the top 3 Russian arms importers in Asia. 
During the same year period, Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan were the top 3 American arms 
importers in the Asia. As a result, this study used these 6 countries in East and Southeast 
countries. Second, the study has come across few missing data. Finally, the short time frame 
allotted to this study has certainly reduced the exploration of a larger literature for this thesis. 
However, these diverse aforementioned limitations have not impeded the academic integrity 
and findings of this thesis. 
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The findings of this thesis also suggests that the two main arms suppliers in the Asian 
region compete with each other through their Asian military allies. On one hand  a  large quantity 
of arms were sold (in the case of Russia), on the other hand, a stress was put on quality of 
arms sold (in the case the U.S.). To grasp the extent to which Russian and American arms sales 
to Asia impact on the balance of military power in this region, it will be relevant for a future 




This thesis is about Russian arms sales to its military partners in East and Southeast Asia, 
and the implications of these arms sales on the balance of military power between the U.S. and 
Russia in these regions. Chiefly this study addresses the question regarding whether Russian 
arms sales to China have disrupted the balance of military power in East and Southeast Asia. To 
address the question, I set a premise that would determine whether the balance of military 
power is disrupted or not in East and Southeast Asia. The reason for that premise is that while 
there is much press and scholarly literature on Russian arms sales to China as a factor that has 
upset the balance of military power in the Asian region, the evidence showing such a disruption 
remain inconsistent. Thus, the premise in this study states that, for a country to shift the 
balance of military power in a region, this country would necessary show three independent 
variables, including the highest military expenditure as a share of Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP), the highest quantity and quality of arms compared to these of other countries in the 
region. My sample consists of Russian military allies in East and Southeast Asian, including 
China,  India,  and  Vietnam;  and  American  military  allies  in  the  East  and  Southeast  Asia, 
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including Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea, given that the U.S. is one of the biggest arms 
suppliers in this region. I used descriptive statistics and comparative case study to get my 
results. 
The results for this thesis are summarized in Table 4 above, and suggest that Russian 
arms sales to China have not disrupted the balance of military power from 2000 to 2013. 
Actually, no single country in the sample had upset the balance with its arms purchase because 
none of them had all three independent variables required to shift the balance of military 
power. While China is the second buyer of Russian arms, Russia has sold more arms to India. 
Moreover, had the quality of Russian arms purchased by India been the highest, India would 
have disrupted the balance of military power in East and Southeast Asia because it had a high 
GDP (3%), the highest quantity of arms, and would have had a quality level of 3 for its arms. But 
that was not the case in this study. While Russia used arms sales to India to position itself in the 
Asian region, the United States reassured its positions in the region through its military 
cooperation with South Korea that had not only the highest quantity of American modern arms, 
but also the one of the highest GDP, advancing Japan and Taiwan. Following the rationale by 
Shambaugh (2000) who argues that quantity of (obsolete) arms is irrelevant, in combat, 
compared to quality, I would continue his rationale by saying that South Korea has all three 
necessary variables to shift the military power in Asia if one considered that the quantity of the 
Chinese and Indian arms were obsolete, albeit higher. 
I am aware that this  is an unpopular theory to assert. Because South Korea is an 
“advanced democracy and a key ally” (Clinton, 2014). Nevertheless, if one sticks to 
Shambaugh’s  (2002)  argument,  it  seems logic to argue  that  the  superiority  in  quantity  of 
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Russian arms sold to India (26,516) and China (24,108) were irrelevant against the U.S’s arms 
held by South Korea (10,110). Therefore, India was left with 3 percent of GDP, which was high, 
but not enough because it needed the other two variables to stay in the course, needless to 
mention the 2.1 percent of China’s GDP that could not hold. Japan, and Taiwan were 
disadvantaged by the inferiority of GDP and quantity of arms. As a result, South Korea was the 
perfect candidate for the shift of the military power in East Asia from 2000 to 2013, based on 
Shambaugh’s theory of the significance of the quality of arms in combat. However, this thesis 
downplays such argument and conclude that the balance of military power in East and 
Southeast Asia has been maintained from 2000 to 2013 through arms sales by Russia and the 
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